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Smoking Parents, Their Children, and the
Home: Do the Courts Have the
Authority to Clear the Air?
MICHAEL S. MOORBY*
I. Introduction
Democracy can be harsh. As the lone nonsmoker in a
large family, I have often been exposed to the cigarette smoke
of others. I have frequently protested, claiming a right to
breathe fresh air. My family members have consistently
countered by asserting a right to smoke. To date, my position
has not once carried the day. The result has invariably been
smoke-filled holidays and family reunions.
Nonetheless, my plight is not so bad. As an adult, I have
the power to prohibit smoking in my own home or to walk
away from objectionable, smoky areas. Children, however, do
not have these options and are less capable of protecting their
own health and safety. Additionally, children are more sus-
ceptible to the dangers of secondhand smoke than adults.
Recently, courts in several states have recognized the
need to protect children, ordering parents to refrain from
smoking in the presence of their children. Such orders, typi-
* This article is written in memory of my late brother, Robert J. Moorby
11. Robert was a harsh critic of the views reflected in this article until his un-
timely passing in December 1994. Ironically, his insights allowed me to better
address the arguments of my opponents.
The author greatly appreciates the work of all those who contributed to this
article, with special thanks to Professor Donald Doernberg.
827
1
828 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
cally issued in the context of child custody proceedings, have
elicited vigorous opposition from smokers, many of whom
have asserted that smoking in the home is a fundamental pri-
vacy right.'
This Comment examines the propriety of court orders
prohibiting parents from smoking in their homes in the pres-
ence of their children. Section II discusses the effects of
secondhand smoke on children, with emphasis on the risk as-
sessment released by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) in December 1992. Section III presents the judicial
and legislative treatment of secondhand smoke issues. Sec-
tion IV outlines the privacy issues involved in court orders
that prescribe the circumstances under which parents can
smoke in their own home. Section V espouses the view that
smoking in the home is not a fundamental privacy right and
therefore the courts have the authority to curtail parental
smoking in the home. Section VI concludes that courts not
only have the authority, but also the duty, to issue orders
that protect children from exposure to secondhand smoke in-
the home.2
1. See Judge Restricts Smoking in Custody Case, UPI, Aug. 15, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Crnws File. The mother in a California cus-
tody case, who was ordered to refrain from smoking in the presence of her five-
year-old son, was quoted as saying, 'This is crazy. This is the first time ever
that a court comes into your house and dictates to you how you are to behave in
your own home." Id. Terry Eagan of the Tobacco Institute and Tobacco Action
Network, also quoted in the story, said he would ask his lawyers to investigate
the case: "The first thing that comes to mind is the privacy issue." Id. For an
additional example of a court-ordered ban on smoking in the presence of chil-
dren, see Lamacchia v. Lamacchia, No. 91D 0004 (P. and Fam. Ct., Middlesex
Co., Ma. 1991). The Lamacchia case got considerable attention from the media.
See, e.g., Judge Bars Smoking in Presence of Child, UPI, Jan. 9, 1992, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Crnws File.
2. Issues of enforceability are beyond the scope of this article. This article
focuses, instead, on whether the court has the authority and duty to issue or-
ders prohibiting smoking in the home.
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II. Effects of Secondhand Smoke on Children
More than thirty years have passed since the 1964 Sur-
geon General's Report linked smoking with lung cancer.3 An
estimated 434,000 smokers die each year in the United
States as a result of their habit.4 In 1986, the Surgeon Gen-
eral concluded that exposure to secondhand smoke presents
serious health risks to nonsmokers. 5 The debate between
smokers and nonsmokers has raged ever since, with smokers
claiming a fundamental right to smoke and nonsmokers
claiming a right to breathe fresh air.6
In December 1992, the EPA released an extensive report
categorizing environmental tobacco smoke, otherwise known
as ETS or secondhand smoke, as a Group A carcinogen 7 and
attributed an estimated 3,000 deaths of nonsmokers annually
to secondhand smoke exposure.8 This categorization at-
tracted the attention of parents, employers, attorneys, legis-
lators, businessmen, the public at large,9 as well as the
3. See Christopher Scanlan, Last Puff. EPA Report Could Bring Tougher
Limits on Smoking, Tobacco Foes Say, THE PHOENIX GAZETTE, Jan. 7, 1993, at
Al.
4. ENVIONmENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF
PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DisoRDERs, at 2-1 (1992) [herein-
after HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING].
5. See PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND Hum. SERVICES,
THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE StIR-
GEON GENERAL, 37-65 (1986) [hereinafter PuBuc HEALTH SERVICE] (determin-
ing that there was a link between secondhand smoke exposure and acute and
chronic respiratory disease).
6. See, e.g., Susan Freinkel, Ex-Spouses Can't Light Up; Non-Smokers
Find New Cudgel in Custody Fights, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993, at 2.
7. See HEALTH EFFECTS OF PAsSIVE SMOKING, supra note 4, at 2-9. EPA
has listed three classifications of suspected human carcinogens: "Ml) Group A
consists of known human carcinogens; (2) Group B consists of probable human
carcinogens; and (3) Group C consists of possible human carcinogens." Palmer
v. Del Webb's High Sierra, 838 P.2d 435, 448 n.15 (Nev. 1992). Other examples
of Group A carcinogens are asbestos, arsenic and benzene. Id.
8. See HEALTH EFFECTS OF PAsSIVE SMoKING, supra note 4, at 1-4.
9. Employers, when faced with smoking-in-the-workplace issues, must
now consider the possibility of negligence and workers' compensation claims
arising from exposure to secondhand smoke. See ACTION ON SMOKING AND
HEALTH (ASH), ASH SMOKING AND HEALTH REVIEW, SPECIAL REPORT, INVOLUN-
TARY SMOKING: A FACTUAL BASIS FOR ACTION at 9, (July-Aug. 1992). Some di-
vorced parents have sought orders preventing their ex-spouses from smoking in
the presence of their children. See Tamar Lewin, Smokers Find Mark Against
1995] 829
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tobacco industry.'0 The report, several years in the mak-
ing," also included staggering conclusions regarding the ef-
Them In Fight for Custody of Their Children, N.Y. TmEs, Oct. 16, 1993, at § 1,
8. See also generally Martin Dyckman, Make the Smokers Pay Up, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, Jan. 12, 1993, at 9A. The Texas Attorney General recently filed
lawsuits against five major fast food chains, including McDonald's, Kentucky
Fried Chicken, Taco Bell, Long John Silver's, and Burger King, demanding bet-
ter protection for children against secondhand smoke. See Robert Frank, Fast-
Food Chains Face Texas Suit On Smoking Areas, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1994, at
B14. The Texas Attorney General alleged that the non-smoking areas in those
restaurants did not adequately shield children from secondhand smoke expo-
sure. Id. Less than two weeks later, McDonald's announced it would make its
domestic company-owned restaurants smoke-free, which led to Texas dropping
its lawsuit against McDonald's. Texas Drops Suit After Firm Sets Smoke-Free
Restaurants, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1994, at A9. The suits filed by the Texas
Attorney General quickly followed an announcement by another major fast food
chain, Arby's, that it was implementing a no-smoking policy at all its corporate-
owned restaurants and would encourage its franchisers to do the same. See
Arby's Snuffs Smoking in Restaurants, Reuters, Jan. 25, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
10. On June 22, 1993, six tobacco growers, including Philip Morris and R.J.
Reynolds, Co., filed a lawsuit against the EPA in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, challenging the validity of
EPA's risk assessment which categorized secondhand smoke as a "Group A"
carcinogen. Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency, 857 F. Supp. 1137 (M.D.N.C. 1994).
See also Julie Tilsner, Secondhand Smoke's Second Hearing?, Bus. WK, July 5,
1993, at 40. The EPA subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds
that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction over the report, since it was
neither a regulation nor an administrative action. See Andrea Shalal-Esa, EPA
Files Motion to Dismiss Tobacco Suit, Reuters, July 21, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Accordingly, the EPA's secondhand smoke
report had no binding effect on anyone and technically amounted to no more
than an official opinion. E~vmIRO mNTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA
DESIGNATES PASSIVE SMOKING A "CLASS A" OR KNOWN HUMAN CARCINOGEN,
1993 WL 52157 (Jan. 7, 1993) [hereinafter EPA DESIGNATION]. The tobacco in-
dustry is concerned with the practical effect of the EPA Report. See Shalal-Esa,
supra. OSHA is expected to take action based on the report. Id. Despite the
report's non-binding effect, the lawsuit brought by Philip Morris, et al., sur-
vived EPA's motion to dismiss. See Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabiliza-
tion Corp., 857 F. Supp. at 1140, 1145 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (holding that plaintiffs
had stated a valid cause of action -under the Administrative Procedure Act al-
leging "that the classification of ETS as a known human carcinogen is arbitrary
and capricious ... [and] EPA did not follow its guidelines when classifying
ETS. .... ."
11. The report had been in development since 1988. EPA DESIGNATION,
supra note 10, at 2. It was prepared under authority of the Radon Gas and
Indoor Air Quality Research Act of 1986 (Title IV Superfund). Id. Following a
second review in the summer of 1992, EPA's Science Advisory Board (SAB) en-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/8
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fects of secondhand smoke on children.12 The EPA found that
exposure to secondhand smoke causes additional episodes
and increased severity of asthma attacks in children,13 and
may also be responsible for creating new cases of asthma in
children without any previous symptoms. 14 Each year
secondhand smoke exposure contributes to 150,000 to
300,000 lower respiratory tract infections in children less
than eighteen months old, resulting in 7,500 to 15,000 hospi-
talizations.' 5 Additionally, secondhand smoke exposure in-
creases respiratory symptoms of irritation and middle ear
effusion, and reduces lung function.16
The EPA report has encouraged anti-smoking activists
by providing them with a comprehensive study that supports
their views.' 7 The EPA is not alone in its warnings about
secondhand smoke.' 8 In fact, other studies have revealed
dorsed the report, including the conclusion that secondhand smoke is appropri-
ately categorized as a "Group A" carcinogen. Id. The first review by SAB
occurred in December, 1990. Id.
12. See HEALTH EFFECTS OF PAssIrv SMOKING, supra note 4, at 1-5.
13. Id. The report estimates that exposure to secondhand smoke exacer-
bates symptoms in approximately twenty percent of the two million to five mil-
lion asthmatic children in the United States and that it is a major aggravating
factor in about ten percent of those children. Id.
14. Id. 'Data suggest[s] that relatively high levels of [ETS] exposure are
required to induce new cases of asthma in children." Id. The report estimates
that between 8,000 and 26,000 new cases of asthma in previously asymptomatic
children exposed to ETS from mothers who smoke at least ten cigarettes a day
will emerge annually. HEALTH EFFECTs OF PASSIVE SMOINOG, supra note 4, at
1-5, 1-6.
15. Id. at 1-5. Lower respiratory infections include pneumonia, bronchitis
and bronchiolitis. Id.
16. Id.
17. John Banzhaf I, founder of Action on Smoking and Health, an anti-
smoking group in Washington, D.C., was among those elated when EPA re-
leased the report: " Before the EPA report came out, we were literally sending
attorneys a fax of [articles] from the New England Journal of Medicine or...
[the Journal of the American Medical Association]. We had nothing which was
a single authoritative governmental-type report.'" Freinkel, supra note 6, at 2.
18. Groups which have concluded that secondhand smoke exposure causes
cancer include the United States Public Health Service, National Academy of
Sciences, National Cancer Institute, National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health, World Health Organization, American Medical Association, and
the American Cancer Society. See ACTION ON SMOKING AND HEALTH (ASH),
ASH SMOKING AND HEALTH REvIEw, SPECIAL REPORT, INVOLUNTARY SMOKING:
1995]
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that additional risks are associated with secondhand smoke
exposure. For example, a study at Stanford University in
California concludedthat secondhand smoke exposure in the
home causes six percent of cancers in children and eighteen
percent of childhood leukemia.19 Furthermore, the Center for
Disease Control estimated that 702 deaths previously attrib-
uted to Sudden Infant Death Syndrome 20 actually resulted
from maternal smoking.21 Additionally, a study at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina found that smokers' children scored
lower on vocabulary and reasoning ability tests than children
of non-smokers. 22 Riding the tide of a movement that has
transformed a once-glamorous habit into one often resulting
in the ostracism of smokers, litigants desiring bans on ciga-
rette smoking are increasingly bringing these reports and
studies into courtrooms. 23
III. Judicial and Legislative Treatment of Secondhand
Smoke Issues
A. Background
Courts have considered the effects of secondhand smoke
in a variety of legal contexts. In a recent case, Helling v. Mc-
Kinney,24 the Court held that a prisoner who claimed he was
A FACTUAL BASIS FOR ACTION, ASH 4-PAGE SPECIAL SECTION (July-Aug. 1992)
[hereinafter ASH SPECIAL SECTION].
19. See Marilyn Dunlop, Proof Rises Against Second-Hand Smoke, THE To-
RONTO STAR, July 12, 1991, at A2.
20. Sudden Infant Death Syndrome is the most frequent cause of death in
infants aged one month to one year. See HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING,
supra note 4, at 7-52. About two of every 1,000 live-born infants die unexpect-
edly, usually during sleep, with no significant evidence of fatal illness at au-
topsy. Id. The causes of these deaths are unknown; the most widely accepted
theories suggest that these unexplained deaths involve some sort of respiratory
failure. Id.
21. See HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING, supra note 4, at 8-15. While
the EPA report concurred with the numbers and methodology used in the CDC
study, it was unable to pinpoint the degree to which secondhand smoke was
responsible for the deaths, since it was believed that in utero and lactation ex-
posure also contributed. Id.
22. See ASH SPECIAL SECTION, supra note 18. The study accounted for a
large number of other factors in coming to its conclusion. Id.
23. See Scanlan, supra note 3, at Al.
24. 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/8
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involuntarily subjected to secondhand smoke stated a valid
cause of action under the Eighth Amendment's clause25
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment.26 In another
case, Alexander v. California Unemployment Insurance Ap-
peals Board,27 the court found that an allergic nonsmoker,
who quit her job after refusing to work in an area where co-
workers smoked, was entitled to unemployment benefits. 28
Furthermore, a few courts have held that a person who ex-
poses another person to secondhand smoke can, under cer-
tain circumstances, be liable for battery.29
Though the protective tenor of these cases may suggest
otherwise, there is no fundamental right to breathe fresh air.
A fundamental right to breathe fresh air was asserted and
rejected in Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dis-
trict,3 0 which involved plaintiffs who objected to smoking in
the Louisiana Superdome. The Gasper court dismissed the
action, holding that there was no constitutional authority for
the plaintiffs' position.31
Agency members and legislators, as well as judges, are
dealing with secondhand smoke issues. Last year, for exam-
ple, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) introduced proposed rules that would substantially
25. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted" U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
26. To prevail on the merits, the prisoner must show, inter alia, that "soci-
ety considers the risk [of secondhand smoke exposure] to be so grave that it
violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to
such a risk." Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2482.
27. 163 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
28. Id. at 412. The Aexander court held that because she was able to work
and continued to search for work in a non-smoking environment she was enti-
tled to benefits. Id.
29. See Junda Woo, Blowing Smoke Around Others May Be Battery, WALL
ST. J., April 11, 1994, at B1. According to the article, civil courts in California,
Georgia and Ohio have held that exposing another to secondhand smoke can
amount to battery: "[A] smoker who knows that someone nearby is allergic [to
secondhand smoke] - and who continues to smoke in that person's presence - is
a fair target for a civil suit. ... " Id.
30. 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
31. Id. at 899.
SMOKING PARENTS 833
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curtail smoking in the workplace. 32 Under the proposed
rules, employers must either prohibit smoking or establish
designated smoking areas.33 If the employer opts for desig-
nated smoking areas, it must ensure that smoking is confined
to that area and that the area sufficiently contains the to-
bacco smoke from escaping into smoke-free areas.34 Further-
more, the proposed rules state that "[tihe employer shall
assure that employees are not required to enter designated
smoking areas in the performance of normal work activi-
ties."35 While the OSHA rules target workplaces, a bill
known as the "Indoor Air Act of 1993"36 could lead to regula-
tion of smoking in all public places. The bill, which provides
for "a national program to reduce the threat to human health
posed by exposure to contaminants in the air indoors,"37 is
headed for the Senate.38
B. Child Custody Determinations
Recently, secondhand smoke issues have appeared with
increasing frequency in child custody proceedings.3 9 The par-
amount consideration in deciding which parent should be
awarded custody in a child custody action is the "best inter-
ests of the child."40 The "best interests of the child" standard
is very broad and allows judges to consider all factors they
deem relevant.4 ' Some courts have recognized parental
smoking habits as a relevant factor in their custodial deter-
minations. 42 However, since so many other factors are in-
32. See 65 Fed. Reg. 15968 (1994).
33. Id. at 16037.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. H.R. 2919, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
37. Id.
38. Tony Dawe, Facilities at Glaxo's U.S. Headquarters in North Carolina,
THE TmIEs, Feb. 22, 1995, at -.
39. See Nathan Cobb, Air Battle; In Divorce Proceeding, Father Cites Wife's
Smoking in Bid for Custody, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 8, 1994, at 1; see also
infra notes 50-83 and accompanying text.
40. 4 Am. JUR. 2D Annulment of Marriage § 103 (1962). See also
Freiderwitzer v. Freiderwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89 (1982).
41. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 50-83 and accompanying text.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/8
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volved in such determinations, the weight to be placed on
parental smoking habits fluctuates depending upon the facts
of each case. Factors commonly used in determining child
custody are the character and resources of the parents, 43 the
advantages that are expected to be given to the child if cus-
tody is awarded to either of them, 4 the wishes of the par-
ents,45 the wishes of the child,46 the interaction and
interrelationship of the child with his parents, siblings and
other persons who have a significant impact upon the child,47
the child's adjustments to his home, school and community,48
and the mental and physical health of all individuals in-
volved.49 Since the "best interests of the child" gives a judge
a great deal of discretion, the weight to be placed on parental
smoking habits may also depend on a judge's personal convic-
tions. The existing cases that address this issue vary greatly.
As a result, a litigant cannot be certain how much considera-
tion parental smoking will receive in his or her case, or that it
will be considered at all.
Some courts have acknowledged that parental smoking
negatively impacts a child's health, yet have placed little
weight on this factor when determining custody. In Helm v.
Helm, for example, the court affirmed a custodial decision in
favor of the smoking father.50 In Helm, the nonsmoking
mother raised the issue of her ex-husband's smoking habit
and asserted that his secondhand smoke posed risks to their
child's health.51 The court recognized secondhand smoke ex-
posure as a legitimate factor in assessing the best interests of
the child, yet did not disturb the custodial decision made by
the trial court. The court stated that "[i]deally, no child
should be exposed to cigarette smoke in any degree. It must
be given some consideration in the selection of a custodian for
43. 59 Am. JuR. 2D Parent and Child § 26 (1987).
44. Id.




49. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 402.
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the child. However, it is one of many factors to be considered,
and is not necessarily the dominant or decisive considera-
tion."52 Helm involved a healthy child, which may partially
explain that court's unwillingness to alter the original custo-
dial determination.
Other courts have placed considerable weight on paren-
tal smoking habits where the child's existing health problems
were exacerbated by secondhand smoke exposure. For exam-
ple, in Lizzio v. Lizzio,53 a smoking mother lost joint custody
of her children, one of which was asthmatic. 54 The court's de-
cision rested entirely on the smoking habits of the mother
and her husband.55 Despite a recommendation by the chil-
dren's law guardian that joint custody continue, the court
awarded primary and physical custody to the father.56 The
Lizzio opinion contains some of the strongest anti-smoking
language found in the line of custody cases:
The Court is not as optimistic as the Law Guardian nor
can it permit a child to be exposed to imminent danger
upon the supposition that a mother who has ignored medi-
52. Id. The court gave the following explanation for its affirmance:
The decision of the Trial Court was influenced by the fact that the
child would remain in a familiar day care facility if left with the
father, but would be transferred to a different facility if transferred
to the mother, who is employed. Undoubtedly, the Trial Court was
impressed by the testimony of a third party, the day care provider
of the child, that she had cared for the child from infancy, that the
father was the one who ordinarily brought the child to the care
center and returned for him; that she observed the mother's super-
vision of the child to be "chaotic,"[;] that the father is orderly and
cooperative in managing the child and promoting his best interests;
and that, from the time the father received custody ... the child has
been content, happy and has improved.
Id. at *4, *5.
53. 618 N.Y.S.2d 934 (F. Ct. Fulton Co. 1994).
54. Id. at 935-6.
55. Id. at 937-8.
56. Id. at 937. The opinion states: "While the Law Guardian finds that the
mother and stepfather's smoking habits are injurious to the children and that,
to date, she has not recognized the serious threat that smoking poses to her son,
he stops short of recommending a custodial change and hopes that the mother
will come to her senses and will stop jeopardizing her child's life." Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/8
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cal advice for many years will now see the light and do the
right thing to protect her children.
[Furthermore, w]e are at a point in time when.., a
parent or guardian could be prosecuted successfully for
neglecting his or her child as a result of subjecting the in-
fant to an atmosphere contaminated with health-destruc-
tive tobacco smoke.
The pivotal issue in this case is cigarette smoke. But
for that issue and the health risk that smoking poses, the
Court would continue the custody arrangement... . 57
Mitchell v. Mitchell,58 another child custody proceeding,
hinged on the adverse effects of the mother's smoking on her
asthmatic child.59 Both the child's mother and maternal
grandmother smoked in the presence of the child.60 The
court awarded custody to the child's father, a nonsmoker,
while the child's mother was granted conditional visitation
rights requiring her to provide a smoke-free environment for
the child.61 The court concluded that the mother's failure to
refrain from smoking in the child's presence, despite the rec-
ommendation of the child's physician that she do so, was
strong evidence of a "lack of proper concern for the welfare of
the child."62
A similar result was reached in Pizzitola v. Pizzitola,63
where the court awarded custody of the child to the nonsmok-
ing father, despite the mother's status as primary caretaker
during the marriage.64 In yet another custody case, In re
Brett Lee Bryant v. Wakely, 65 a mother serving a prison term
sought to place her child, who suffered from severe respira-
57. 618 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
58. 1991 WL 63674 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
59. Id. at *1.
60. Id.
61. The court granted visitation rights to the mother "with the condition
that [she] and the grandmother not smoke in the presence of the child, and that
they take all acts necessary to rid their homeplace of any lingering smoke
before the child arrives for his visitation." Id.
62. 1991 WL 63674 at *3.
63. 748 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
64. Id. at 569-70.
65. No. 131708 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
1995] 837
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tory problems, in the custody of the child's maternal grand-
mother, who smoked.66 The trial court found that the child
needed a smoke-free environment which the grandmother
could not provide.67 Accordingly, the court denied custody to
the grandmother, terminated the mother's custodial rights,
and awarded custody to the Department of Social Services. 68
Visitation rights have also been altered by courts as a
result of a child's exposure to secondhand smoke. In Badeaux
v. Badeaux,69 for instance, the nonsmoking mother of a
twenty-month-old asthmatic child70 sought and won a reduc-
tion of the father's visitation rights.71 The Court of Appeals
of Louisiana emphasized the father's smoking habits in af-
firming the trial court's decision.72
C. Protective Orders
Judicial consideration of parental smoking habits is not
limited to child custody determinations. Some courts have
gone a step further by issuing protective orders that prescribe




69. 541 So.2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
70. The child in Badeaux, who had bronchial asthma, was prone to repeated
upper respiratory infections requiring antibiotics. Id. at 302.
71. Id. Originally, the father's visitation rights were as follows: every other
weekend from 6 p.m. Friday to 6 p.m. Sunday; every Wednesday from 9 a.m. to
5 p.m. when the father was not working, from 6 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. when he was
working; one week in June; one week in July; one week in August and four
specified holidays. Id. The visitation rights were reduced to: every other week-
end from 8 a.m. Saturday to 6 p.m. Sunday; one week in June; one week in July
and specified holidays. Id.
72. Id. at 302-303. The Court of Appeals of Louisiana, in looking for justifi-
cation for the trial court's reduction of the father's visitation rights, placed great
weight on the smoking habits of the father:
Timothy Badeaux [the father] testified that he, his mother and his
step-father, with whom he lived when [his son] visited, were smok-
ers. He admitted knowing that exposure to cigarette smoke was
bad for the child. While noting the love and affection of the father
for his son, the trial judge cited the cigarette smoking and its effect
on the child's health as a further reason for limited visitation.
Id.
73. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/8
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even issued orders protecting healthy children. For example,
in Unger v. Unger,74 a divorced couple sought to finalize cus-
tody arrangements for their two healthy children.75 A joint
custody agreement signed by both parents contained a provi-
sion prohibiting the parents from smoking in the presence of
their children.76 The agreement limited the mother's smok-
ing to her bedroom when the children were in her home.77
The nonsmoking husband later sought to reopen the custody
issue, alleging that one of his children suffered from a serious
cough resulting from exposure to the mother's secondhand
smoke.7 8 The court reopened the custody issue, the result of
which is pending. 79 Moreover, the court revoked the mother's
bedroom smoking privileges and required her to "ensure that
there [be] no [smoke] in her home or her vehicle for a period
of ten hours before the children are present." 0 The court
based its rulings in great part on the EPA report.81
Perhaps the most far-reaching decision in this area is
Strathmann v. Foster,8 2 a child custody case. The court re-
quired the father to refrain from smoking in the presence of
74. 644 A.2d 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. CIL Div. 1994).
75. Id. at 692.
76. Id. The provision stated:
Both parties are restrained from allowing smoking of tobacco in the
presence of the children at any location and any enclosed areas
such as homes or automobiles and to prevent the effect of secondary
inhalation of tobacco smoke. The wife shall designate her bedroom
as the only area where she will smoke or anyone else will smoke if
the children are present in her home. The wife shall be permitted
to smoke in the living area if the children are not present with the
understanding that she will purchase, at her own, expense, an air
purifier which shall be a sufficient air purifier which shall be oper-




79. Unger, 644 A.2d at 694. The court reopened the custody issue following
a hearing during which the father supported his allegations to the satisfaction
of the court. Id. The matter was referred to a psychologist for an evaluation to
aid the court in its custody determination. Id.
80. Id. at 695.
81. Id. at 692-3. The court placed great weight on the testimony of a doctor
who relied upon the EPA report in establishing the serious health risks to chil-
dren stemming from secondhand smoke exposure. Id.
82. No. 4663-A-1990 (C.P. Erie County, Pa. 1991).
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his children; he was further prohibited from smoking in his
home for at least forty-eight hours prior to the children's
visits. 83
The above cases focus on smokers who are divorced or in
the process of divorcing.84 However, protection from second-
hand smoke has also been provided to children in the marital
home. In Roofeh v. Roofeh,85 the court issued a temporary
order requiring the wife to confine her smoking to one room in
the house and to refrain from smoking in the presence of her
children and husband. 86 Although the wife in Roofeh had
filed for divorce,8 7 the court derived its authority to issue the
temporary order from its "inherent power in matrimonial
matters to safeguard the health and safety of [spouses] and
children."88 Thus, courts seem willing to provide protection
to children whether their parents are married or divorced.8 9
83. Id.
84. Attorney C. Clay Greene, who is currently representing a client in op-
posing an anti-smoking court order in a child custody case in Contra Costa
County, California, claims that divorcing parents who smoke are being unfairly
singled out. See Lewin, supra note 9. But John Banzhaf III, founder of Action
on Smoking and Health (ASH), an anti-smoking group in Washington, D.C.,
said the divorce setting was merely the logical first step for a movement that he
hopes will ultimately protect the children of married couples as well, since the
courts have already gained entree into the lives of divorcing families. Freinkel,
supra note 6.
85. 525 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
86. Id. at 769.
87. The wife filed for divorce on May 22, 1987 on the grounds of cruel and
inhuman treatment. Id. at 766. The husband brought the Roofeh case on Jan.
14, 1988, while the divorce action was still ongoing. Id.
88. Id. at 769.
89. A court has the power to protect children in broken and stable house-
holds, but the courts cannot open the door to the home on their own initiative.
When a spouse reaches the point where he or she is willing to bring suit against
his or her spouse, chances are that divorce is imminent. Thus, orders protect-
ing children from secondhand smoke will continue to arise almost exclusively in
the context of divorce proceedings, despite the judicial system's increasing will-
ingness to safeguard children from secondhand smoke regardless of the paren-
tal circumstances, unless other statutory avenues capable of getting the




IV. The Right to Privacy
The term "right to privacy" cannot be found in the Con-
stitution.90 Instead, the right to privacy is an implied right
rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.91
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part that "[n]o state
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law... "92 Specifically, the "liberty" com-
ponent of the Due Process Clause gives rise to the right to
privacy.9 3
The right to privacy has gradually been expanded by the
courts on a case-by-case basis.94 The protection afforded a
specific privacy right depends upon how it is categorized. 95
Privacy rights are split into two categories: fundamental and
non-fundamental. 96 In Palko v. Connecticut,97 the Supreme
Court defined a fundamental right as one that is "implicit in
90. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (stating that "Etihe Constitu-
tion does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.").
91. The contemporary view is that the "liberty" component of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides the strongest constitutional
basis for the right to privacy. See id. at 152-53 (identifying the Fourteenth
Amendment as the basis for the right to privacy: "[The] right of privacy,
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendments concept of personal lib-
erty... as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153 (em-
phasis added); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (stating that the word liberty in the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause gives rise to the constitutional protec-
tion of a woman's decision to abort her pregnancy); Cf., Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (alluding to several possible bases for the right to pri-
vacy, including the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments).
92. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XlV, § 1.
93. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
94. See also infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
95. One commentator, opining that the characterization of a right as funda-
mental invariably leads to the invalidation of the infringing law, described the
heightened scrutiny applicable in fundamental rights analysis as "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv.
L. Ray. 1 (1972).
96. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938),
for the rationale behind varying levels of judicial scrutiny.
97. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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the concept of ordered liberty"98 such that "neither liberty nor
justice would exist if [it] was sacrificed."99 Infringements on
fundamental rights are subject to a strict scrutiny analy-
sis.100 The strict scrutiny standard requires the state to show
a compelling interest justifying the infringement' 0 and fur-
ther requires that legislative enactments be narrowly drawn
to express only the interest at stake. 0 2 Infringements on
non-fundamental rights, however, are examined with a
lower, more deferential standard, requiring only that the
state have a legitimate interest with means that are ration-
ally related to furthering that state interest. 03
Procreative activities are at the forefront of the right to
privacy. For instance, Roe v. WadeL0 4 tested the constitution-
ality of a state law criminalizing abortions.' 0 5 The Supreme
Court opined that the "right of privacy... is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy." 0 6 The Court further stated that the right to
decide whether to have an abortion is fundamental. 0 7 Ac-
cordingly, it was incumbent upon the state to show a compel-
ling interest justifying the infringement on that right. The
state asserted that it had a compelling interest in protecting
prenatal life from the time of conception. 0 8 However, the
parties challenging the law argued that a "woman's right [to
98. Id. at 325.
99. Id. at 326, quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908).
100. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
101. Id. at 155-6.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1943).
104. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 153.
107. The Court characterized this right as fundamental by implication, not
explicitly. The Court cited Palko to define "fundamental rights" and later ap-
plied strict scrutiny to the anti-abortion law at issue: "Where certain 'funda-
mental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these
rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interesi... and that legisla-
tive enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake." Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 156. The Court acknowledged that the state also had an interest
in the health of the mother; this interest became "compelling" at approximately
the end of the first trimester. Id. at 163.
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decide] is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her
pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for
whatever reasons she alone chooses."10 9 The Court did not
fully agree with either position, stating that the interests of a
pregnant woman must be weighed against the state's interest
in protecting potential human life."10 The Court, relying
heavily on medical authority,"' held that a state's interest in
protecting a fetus becomes compelling, and prohibitions
against abortion permissible, when the fetus is "viable." 112
Thus the Roe v. Wade holding was not an "all-or-nothing" re-
sult, but rather acknowledged and balanced a multitude of
interests. 113 Roe v. Wade was unique among the right to pri-
vacy cases in that it involved "an act [namely, abortion]
109. Id. at 153.
110. The Court stated:
The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. ... [lt is
reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point
in time another interest, that of the health of the mother or that of
potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman's
privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses
must be measured accordingly.
Id. at 159.
111. The Roe v. Wade decision makes several references to medical authority
in its opinion. Early in the opinion, Justice Blackmun wrote "[IUn this opinion
[we] place some emphasis upon medical and medical-legal history and what this
history reveals about man's attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the
centuries." Id. at 117. Blackmun, near the end of the majority opinion, wrote:
"[Our] holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative weights of the respective
interests involved, with the lessons and examples of medical and legal history,
with the lenity of the common law, and with the demands of the profound
problems of the present day." Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
112. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. A fetus is "viable" when it is "potentially able to
live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." Id. at 160. A fetus is
usually viable about seven months after conception. Id.
113. The medical profession had a lot to say about abortion rights under the
Roe v. Wade decision. The court selected viability as the point at which the
state could prohibit abortions. Thus, medical advancements increasing the pe-
riod of viability necessarily resulted in the expansion of states' powers to pro-
hibit abortions. Under Roe v. Wade, a pregnant woman in the 1980s had a
fundamental right to an abortion until the third trimester (about seven months)
of her pregnancy. A woman pregnant in the year 2030, for example, would
likely have far less time in which to exercise her fundamental right to abort her
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fraught with consequences for others."114 Roe v. Wade not
only added an item to the privacy rights menu, but also em-
phasized a key strand in privacy rights analysis which is the
assessment of non-actors' interests.
A common bond among many of the recognized privacy
rights is their close relationship with the family and the
home. Griswold v. Connecticut'1 5 recognized the right to use
contraceptives.' 1 6 The right to privacy also includes the right
"to marry, establish a home and bring up children."117 The
protection given these privacy rights has strengthened the
home's status as a refuge from governmental intrusion. The
Third and Fourth Amendments further contribute to the per-
ception that the home is a hallowed place.
The Third Amendment limits the use of a person's home
to quarter soldiers, with no intrusion allowed in times of
peace without the consent of the owner.118 The Fourth
Amendment guarantees "[tihe right of the people to be secure
in their... houses" and prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures." 119 Statutes imposing criminal or civil liability for
114. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
115. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
116. Id.
117. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Justice McReynolds es-
poused a concept of "liberty" that included, inter alia,
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the com-
mon occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness. Id.
A general right of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their
children was recognized in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(striking down a statute requiring children to attend public schools). A general
right to establish a home was recognized in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977) (striking down a zoning regulation prohibiting extended families
from living together). A right to marry was recognized in Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978) (striking down a statute prohibiting parents from remarry-
ing without proof that all court-ordered child support had been paid and that
the child would not ultimately become financially dependent on the state).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. ]I. The Third Amendment states "[n]o Soldier
shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." Id.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/8
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acts that offend public sensibilities, such as public lewdness
and public intoxication provisions, 120 imply that the home
represents a base of immunity that the government cannot
freely pierce. 121 Traditional rights bestowed upon property
owners, particularly the rights to use and exclude, 122 lend
further credibility to what has generally been described as a
right "to do what you want in the confines of your own
home."' 23
In Stanley v. Georgia,m2 the Court illustrated how con-
duct unprotected outside of the home can, under some cir-
cumstances, be protected within its confines. 125 Stanley
involved a law prohibiting possession of obscene materials. 26
Stanley was charged under the law after such materials were
found in his home.' 27 The Court, in holding that the First
Amendment protects the private possession of obscene mater-
ials, stated that the "right to receive information and ideas,
regardless of their social worth,.., is fundamental to our free
120. N.Y. PENAL LAw, §§ 245.00, 240.40 (McKinney 1992).
121. The existence of these statutes reveals that the government is more tol-
erant of certain types of conduct when occurring within the home. See generally
N.Y. PENAL LAw, tit. N (McKinney 1992) (including public lewdness, public use
of obscene language and/or gestures, appearance in public under the influence
of narcotics).
122. The power of ownership is reflected in the following:
[t]here is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and
engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises
over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right
of any other individual in the universe.
2 WILLrAm BLAcKsroNE, COmmENTAwuE_ ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 2 (1782).
123. Attorney C. Clay Greene, who represented Susan Tanner in a 1993
child custody case in which Tanner was the target of a court order prohibiting
her from smoking in the presence of her two daughters, cited a pair of abortion
cases (Roe, 410 U.S. 113 and Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp,
226 Cal. Rptr. 361 [1986]) in his brief to support his assertion that a person
generally has a fundamental right to do as he or she wishes while in the privacy
of the home. Freinkel, supra note 5, at 2. With this initial point made, the brief
concluded that the right to smoke in the privacy of one's home is accordingly
fundamental. Id. For further discussion of the Tanner case, see supra note 84.
124. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
125. Id. at 564, 568.
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society." 28 Furthermore, "[if the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read
or what films he may watch." 29 However, laws prohibiting
public possession of obscene materials were not invalidated
by Stanley. 30
The right to do what one wants in the home is not abso-
lute. Bowers v. Hardwickl3s involved a law prohibiting sod-
omy.13 2 Hardwick, the adult male challenging the law, was
charged under the law after committing an act of sodomy in
his bedroom with another adult male.133 The Court phrased
the issue as "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fun-
damental right upon homosexuals to engage in sod-
omy...." -34 After noting a long history of anti-sodomy laws
in this country, the Court concluded that it was "at best, face-
tious" 3 5 to claim that the act of sodomy fell within the Palko
definition of a fundamental right.' 36 Hardwick asserted that
since the acts of sodomy occurred in the privacy of the home,
the acts were protected under Stanley.13-
In declining to broadly construe Stanley and apply it to
Hardwick's conduct, the Court stated that
Stanley did protect conduct that would not have been pro-
tected outside the home...; but the decision was firmly
grounded in the First Amendment. The right pressed upon
us here has no similar support in the text of the Constitu-
tion, and it does not qualify for recognition under the pre-
128. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
129. Id. at 565.
130. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 352 (1971) (holding that dis-
tribution of obscene materials could be prohibited).
131. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
132. Georgia law defnes sodomy as "any sexual act involving the sex organs
of one person and the mouth or anus of another." Id. at 188 n.1.
133. Id. at 187-88.
134. Id. at 190.
135. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
136. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
137. 478 U.S. at 195.
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vailing principles for construing the Fourteenth
Amendment. 138
Hence, since the right to engage in sodomy was not guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment or any other provision of
the Constitution, the challenge to the law in Bowers was
unsuccessful.
Although the place where conduct occurs is sometimes
relevant to privacy rights analysis, it is not dispositive. For
example, Roe v. Wade involved the conduct, namely abortion
prior to viability, which is permissible regardless of where it
occurs. 13 9 However, Stanley involved conduct, the possession
of obscene material,140 which could be prohibited-anywhere
except the home. In contrast, Bowers involved conduct,
namely sodomy, that could be prohibited regardless of where
it occurred.' 4 ' Thus, only under the First Amendment analy-
sis in Stanley was the place where the conduct occurred rele-
vant to the determination of the case. In contrast,
Fourteenth Amendment analysis begins and ends with a
careful examination of the asserted right, not with an inquiry
into where the exercise of that right occurs.
V. Analysis
A. Is Smoking a Fundamental Right?
The right to privacy has emerged as the smokers' consti-
tutional weapon of choice in opposing orders that curb smok-
ing in the home. Specifically, smokers assert a fundamental
right to smoke in the privacy of their homes without govern-
mental interference. 42 The United States Supreme Court
138. Id.
139. See 410 U.S. 113.
140. It is important to note that Stanley did not permit all private possession
of obscene materials, but more narrowly held that the type of material privately
possessed by Stanley could never lead to liability. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495
U.S. 103 (1990) (holding that the defendant did not have a First Amendment
right to privately view pictures of nude minors because of the overriding state
interest in protecting minors).
141. See 478 U.S. 186.
142. For example, when a California judge ordered Anna Maria De Beni
Souza, the mother of a five-year-old boy, to refrain from smoking in his presence
1995] 847
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has not yet addressed the issue of whether smoking in the
home is a fundamental right. In Collins v. City of Harker
Heights,143 the Court stated that "[slubstantive due process
must begin with a careful description of the asserted right,
for the doctrine of self-restraint requires us to exercise the
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in
this field."1 " Thus, smokers do not yet have any authority
for their claims that smoking in the home is a fundamental
privacy right. Until the Supreme Court decides the issue, the
question remains whether the right to privacy is broad
enough to encompass a right to smoke in the home.
Smokers' arguments in favor of treating smoking in the
home as a fundamental right are characteristically location,
rather than activity, oriented. 145 In other words, the smok-
ers' arguments focus on the sanctity of the home and the de-
gree to which that sanctity is disturbed by orders prohibiting
smoking. 146 The smokers' approach resembles the First
Amendment analysis of Stanley, but is not aligned with Four-
teenth Amendment privacy analysis as reflected in Roe v.
Wade and Bowers. Stanley turned on the place where ob-
scene materials were possessed; public possession could be
curtailed while private possession could not. While the Four-
teenth Amendment right to privacy is admittedly closely con-
nected to the home, it is not infringed each time the home is
invaded. The right to privacy exists to protect certain activi-
ties. The protection it gives to the home or any other location
is merely incidental. 47 For example, Roe v. Wade and Bow-
as part of a 1990 child custody ruling in her favor, De Beni Souza responded,
"What right does the court have to dictate my behavior in my own home? This
is not Russia, right?" Judge In Custody Fight Tells Mom: No Smoking, Cm.
TRm., Aug. 16, 1990, § 1 at 3. See also Freinkel, supra note 6.
143. 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992).
144. Collins, 112 S. Ct. at 1068.
145. See generally Victoria L. Wendling, Smoking and Parenting: Can They
Be Adjudged Mutually Exclusive Activities?, 42 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1025, 1046
(1992).
146. See id. at 1067.
147. See Poe v. Uliman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). Justice Harlan, in his dissent,
asserted that a right to privacy analysis properly focuses on the activity in
question, not the location in which it occurs: "if the physical curtilage of the
home is protected, it is surely as a result of solicitude to protect the privacies of
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/8
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ers focused exclusively on the activity involved, rather than
the location in which the activity occurred. Since smoking is
not a First Amendment issue, a location-oriented analysis is
inappropriate. If smoking in the home is to receive protection
as a fundamental right, it must qualify under Fourteenth
Amendment right to privacy analysis.
Palko provides the first step in the right to privacy analy-
sis. The right to smoke in the home is fundamental only if
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"1 48 such that
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it was] sacri-
ficed,"149 In determining whether the Palko criteria have
been met, a court must look to the "traditions and conscience
of [the] people." 50 Tradition appears to be on the side of the
smokers, who have historically had free reign to smoke in the
presence of their children. However, the conscience of the
people, as it relates to smoking, has changed dramatically
over the past ten years.151 Public awareness of the dangers of
secondhand smoke exposure has led to a decline in the
number of smokers in this country.152 State and federal leg-
islatures have responded with laws banning smoking in cer-
tain areas.' 53 Thus, it appears that the long-accepted
tradition of smokers lighting up at their leisure has been re-
placed with a newer, critical wave of public opinion.
A smoker's freedom of choice is impaired when a court
prescribes the circumstances under which the smoker can
light up in his own home. That is not to say, however, that
such an order "sacrifice[s] ... liberty and justice" as contem-
the life within.... The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life."
Id. at 551 (emphasis added).
148. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
149. Id. at 326, quoting Twining, 211 U.S. at 99.
150. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487.
151. See supra note 22 and accompanying text, infra notes 152-153 and ac-
companying text.
152. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Cigarette Smoking Among
Adults-United States, 1993, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, Dec.
23, 1994, at 925. This report states that the "annual prevalence of cigarette
smoking among adult smokers in the United States declined 40% during 1965-
1990...." Id.
153. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
1995] 849
23
850 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
plated by Palko.154 The court orders opposed by the smokers
do not entirely prohibit smoking; they merely prohibit smok-
ing in a manner likely to adversely affect children.1 55 Like
the abortion decision in Roe v. Wade, smoking is "an act
fraught with consequences for others."156 Thus, the compet-
ing interests of the children, whose health is negatively im-
pacted by secondhand smoke exposure, must carry
considerable weight in determining smokers' rights. Justice
is not sacrificed when smokers are told they cannot smoke in
the presence of their children; justice is done. Children can-
not adequately protect themselves from secondhand smoke
exposure and need the state, acting as parens patriae,157 to
intervene. Orders limiting smoking in the presence of chil-
dren effectively juggle the competing interests involved: they
protect children's health and allow parents to smoke, albeit in
an area away from their children. Smokers should have free
reign to light up only when their own health is in danger.
However, allowing smokers, as a fundamental right, to en-
danger the lives of others, is patently unjust.158
Furthermore, the right to smoke has little in common
with other fundamental privacy rights, which typically ad-
vance an "individual['s] interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
154. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
155. Some orders, like the order in Unger, require a smoke-free period prior
to children's visit as well as ban smoking in the children's presence. 644 A.2d
691. These orders are based on the notion that secondhand smoke lingers for a
while before dissipating. Strathmann, No. 4663-A-1990 (C.P. Erie County, Pa.
1991). Other orders simply ban smoking in the presence of children. Roofeh,
525 N.Y.S.2d 765.
156. See supra notes 103-113 and accompanying text.
157. Parens patriae "is the principle that the state must care for those who
cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and cus-
tody from their parents." BIAcis LAw DicTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
158. This point was made in a brief submitted by attorney Thomas Wolfrum
in support of a court order requested by his client, Steve Masone, in a 1993
child custody case in California: "This is not an issue of [a] fundamental right
of privacy.... [A smoker] may shorten his life by smoking tobacco, but he has
no constitutional right to shorten his children's lives." See Freinkel, supra note
6 and accompanying text.
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sonal matters"15 9 and "independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions." 160 "Important" must be interpreted
in light of the rights that the Supreme Court has deemed fun-
damental, for example, use of contraceptives,1 61 abortion,1 62
marriage 63 and child rearing.1 64 All of these rights are inte-
gral components of family planning. Smoking is not. In fact,
the Supreme Court held in Austin v. Tennessee365 that a state
could entirely prohibit the sale of cigarettes under its police
power.1 66 It would be illogical for the Supreme Court to treat
smoking in the home as a fundamental right while permit-
ting the states to prohibit cigarette sales. Otherwise, the
Constitution would yield to the police power. Such a result is,
of course, contrary to settled law.1 67
Finally, there are strong policies against recognizing
smoking in the home as a fundamental right. The states
would have almost no leeway to protect children from second-
hand smoke exposure in the home if strict scrutiny, rather
than the rationality standard, applied to their actions. Chil-
dren are already powerless to evade the dangers of smoke-
filled homes and should be able to rely on the states' police
and parens patriae powers for a remedy. A contrary result
159. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (reviewing a New York statute
which required the public disclosure of the identity of patients, who were pre-
scribed schedule 11 drugs).
160. Id. at 599-600.
161. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
162. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
163. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
164. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
165. 179 U.S. 343 (1900).
166. Id. at 350. See also Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass'ns. v. Tourism Co., 478
U.S. 328 (1986) (reviewing a statute that prohibited the advertising of gambling
facilities within Puerto Rico). 'Mhe term 'police power' connotes the time-tested
conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private interests." Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, N.Y., 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). The standard to determine
whether an exercise of the police power is appropriate is: "first, that the inter-
ests of the public... require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals." Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
167. The police power is subject to limitations of the Constitution, particu-
larly in the area of due process, not vice versa. Marshall v. Kansas City, 355
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would be particularly undesirable and irresponsible given the
increasing awareness in the scientific, political and legal com-
munities, as well as society at large, of the dangers of second-
hand smoke. 168
Smoking in the home is not a fundamental privacy right.
Roe v. Wade instructs that interests of third parties are perti-
nent to the privacy rights analysis. Smoking adversely and
substantially affects the health of children. Palko states that
fundamental rights are those "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty" such that neither "justice nor liberty would ex-
ist if [it] was sacrificed." 169 When the interests involved are
balanced, smoking in the home falls considerably short of
qualifying as a fundamental right under Palko. The Supreme
Court determined long ago in Austin that states can ban the
sale of cigarettes.1 70 It would be counterintuitive to recognize
smoking in the home as fundamental yet allow states to
freely prohibit cigarettes. What right could be more hollow?
B. Smoking and the Slippery Slope
Smoking shares a common thread with the bundle of fun-
damental privacy rights currently protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment: an underlying freedom of choice issue.
Indeed, that is an important issue. After all, if the govern-
ment can prevent parents from smoking around their chil-
dren, what's next? Can the government order parents to feed
their children less candy? Can the government sanction par-
ents because their child watches too much violent television?
It is always important in privacy analysis to be aware of the
slippery slope: "Neither judges nor legislators nor citizens
should permit decisions..., focused as each must be upon its
168. See Frank Jones, Will Smoking Infiltrate Custody Battles?, THE To-
RONTO STAR, Dec. 7, 1992, at B1. In his column, Jones states:
We know enough about the damage smoking does to ban it in the
workplace, on public transportation, in theatres and in almost any
sort of public space you care to imagine. Yet nothing has been done
to protect the most vulnerable group of all, children, from the ef-
fects of smoking in the home.
Id.
169. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
170. 179 U.S. 343 (1900).
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precise context, to be taken without attention to the drift of
its cumulative result."171 Judges must be "scrupulous to dis-
tinguish the slip which leads inexorably down the slope from
the one that does not."172
The dangers to children stemming from secondhand
smoke exposure are real and substantial; medical authority
corroborates this fact and a large segment of the public has
accepted it.173 Nonetheless, skeptics remain. Reluctance to
acknowledge the warnings of the medical profession, how-
ever, is invariably driven by habit or profit. Both are power-
ful. Secondhand smoke exposure is unlike the "dangers"
lining the slippery slope, like diets high in sugar or violent
television shows, because it results from a parent's habitual,
addictive behavior.17 4 The habit often impairs a smoker's
ability to neutrally evaluate the risks to their children. This
extenuating circumstance makes it especially necessary and
appropriate for courts to intervene. Such extenuating cir-
cumstances do not underlie high-sugar diets and violent tele-
vision. Thus, court orders prohibiting at-home smoking in
the presence of children do not provide a basis for regulative
overkill in the area of child care.
This article takes the position that smoking in the home
is not a fundamental right. Regardless, the right to smoke is
entitled to the level of protection from interference conveyed
by the rationality standard. In order to avoid an undesirable
trip down the slippery slope, judges should ensure that their
orders are rationally related to the state's legitimate interest
in safeguarding children. Courts should retreat from the
stance taken in Strathmann, where the judge required, inter
alia, that the father refrain from smoking forty eight hours
prior to his children's visit.175 Secondhand smoke does not
linger for forty eight hours. Thus, the Strathmann order
171. Laurence Tribe, AmElicAN CoNsTIUrIoNAL LAw, § 15-2, at 892 (1978).
172. Id.
173. See PuBLIc HPATH SERVICE, supra note 5, at 21-108.
174. The American Cancer Society reports that nicotine, a drug contained in
tobacco leaves, is more addictive than heroin. Anne Rochelle, News for Rids
Kicking the Habit; How to Help your School, ALANTA CONSTITUTION, Nov. 14,
1994, at A3.
175. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
1995] 853
27
854 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
needlessly deprived the father of his freedom of choice for
much of the forty eight hour period. 176 Although judges have
considerable discretion to issue nonsmoking orders under the
rationality standard they should, in light of the dangers of
the slippery slope, avoid overbroad orders that curtail par-
ents' smoking without a corresponding benefit to a child's
health.
C. Protection of the Children
In a custody case, the facts of the case should control the
weight placed on parental smoking. A smoker's right of
choice should be protected insofar as the smoker refrains
from smoking in the presence of children. However, if there
is sufficient evidence of a parent smoking near the children,
then the habit should be considered in the custodial decision.
The degree to which the habit harms the smoker's chances of
gaining custody depends on the fragility of the child's health.
Smoking in the presence of a healthy child should generally
be considered as one of many factors in the custodial decision.
The judge in a custody case, who is alerted to the parent's
smoking practices, should be prepared to halt such practices
should the smoker emerge as the most fit parent.
Where the child has health problems, such as asthma, a
parent's smoking habit should be given dispositive weight,
since it evidences a blatant disregard for the welfare of the
child.' 7 7 Where both parents smoke in the presence of an
asthmatic child, an order requiring cessation of such prac-
tices should accompany the custody award. Moreover, the
court should retain jurisdiction over the matter with appro-
priate monitoring to assure compliance. 7 8 The custodial par-
ent should be aware of the court's right to place the child in
176. Strathmann, No. 4663-A-1990 (C.P. Erie County, Pa. 1991).
177. See Mitchell, No. 01-A-01-9012-CV-00442, 1991 WL 63674 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1991).
178. In Lizzio, for example, the court directed the law guardian to visit the
households of each parent, consult periodically with the child's physicians, and




foster care and to hold the parent in contempt for violations of
the order.
Courts should recognize that exposing children to
secondhand smoke can possibly amount to criminal conduct.
In New York, for example, exposing a child to secondhand
smoke should, under some circumstances, be considered a vi-
olation of New York Penal Law section 260.10,179 which
states: "A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a
child when... [h]e knowingly acts in a manner likely to be
injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child
less than seventeen years old. . ."180
Fortunately, the number of orders protecting children
from secondhand smoke exposure has steadily increased with
the public's awareness of the hazard. However, judicial pro-
tection should extend beyond situations where a divorcing
parent steps forward and demands relief for the child. For
example, if both parents smoke in the home there is little
chance that the children will be able to escape the smoke-fil-
led environment. Furthermore, children in the marital home
are currently afforded little protection, since protective orders
have arisen almost exclusively in child custody proceedings
as a result of a divorce. Accordingly, the courts should be re-
ceptive to suits brought under the states' child abuse or ne-
glect provisions, or under provisions resembling New York
Penal Law section 260.10.
In New York, an abused child is one who is
less than eighteen years of age whose parent or other per-
son legally responsible for his care... creates or allows to
be created a substantial risk of physical injury to such
child by other than accidental means which causes or cre-
ates a substantial risk of... protracted impairment of
physical or emotional health .... 18 1
In addition, the child neglect statute in New York states
179. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 260.10 (McKinney 1993).
180. Id.
181. N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT § 1012 (e)(ConsoL 1994).
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"[n]eglected child" means a child less than eighteen years
of age.., whose physical, mental or emotional condition
has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming
impaired as a result of the failure of his parent or other
person legally responsible for his care to exercise a mini-
mum degree of care... in providing the child with proper
supervision or guardianship by unreasonably inflicting or
allowing to be inflicted harm, or a substantial risk thereof
... by acts of a... serious nature requiring the aid of the
court .... 182
Use of these statutes to combat secondhand smoke exposure
is only appropriate in extraordinary circumstances which in-
dicate a parent's frequent and severe habit of smoking in the
presence of a child whose intolerance to smoke goes well be-
yond that of the average child, for example, an asthmatic or
highly-allergic child.
In cases involving asthmatic children, a parent's habit of
smoking in the presence of his or her child should be consid-
ered a per se violation of New York Penal Law section 260.10
with abuse or neglect a possibility. A parent's habit of smok-
ing in the presence of a healthy child should be considered as
one of many factors that might collectively support a finding
that the child's welfare is endangered, though it would be in-
sufficient standing alone. Similarly, smoking in the presence
of a healthy child should not, without more, constitute child
neglect or child abuse. Even if a parent is exonerated in a
§ 260.10 case, a child abuse case, or a child neglect case, the
judge should not hesitate to issue a protective order if evi-
dence establishes that the parent smokes in the presence of
children.
Factors pertinent in determining whether a parent has
developed a "habit" of smoking in the presence of the children
include: frequency of such a practice; spatial proximity of the
smoking parent to the child; existence of ventilation and the
parent's toleration of visitors smoking around the children.




There is a trend in the United States toward protecting
adults from secondhand smoke exposure while children, iron-
ically, are left to fend for themselves. For example, many
states have already enacted laws regulating smoking in the
workplace.183 In addition, nonsmoking prisoners are now,
upon request, often relocated to smoke-free cells. 84 Restau-
rants, airlines, and many other facilities used by the public
are also subject to smoking bans.18 5 For an adult, life in a
smoke-free world can be a reality.
It is a different story for children, who generally spend
much of their time in the home. There are no statutes explic-
itly banning smoking in the home. As a result, children are
often adversely affected by smoke in the home which irritates
their eyes, offends their sense of smell, and damages their
health. Furthermore, children are more susceptible to the
dangers of secondhand smoke exposure than adults, increas-
ing the seriousness of the situation. In short, federal and
state governments have made great strides in protecting
their adult constituents, but have left children largely
unprotected.
The courts have the power and duty to protect children in
the home from secondhand smoke exposure. This power ap-
plies whether a child's parents are married or divorced. In
homes where parents are married, children are inadequately
protected because married spouses are unlikely to wage a
war in the courtroom over a smoking issue. With divorce
cases, the parents are already before the court. The state and
federal legislatures can alleviate this discrepancy by enacting
laws protecting children in the home from smoke. Asthmatic
183. See supra note 168.
184. For example, in Helfng discussed supra, the Nevada state prison re-
futed the prisoner's claim of cruel and unusual punishment on the grounds that
it had relocated the prisoner to a smoke-free cell after he complained of second-
hand smoke exposure. 113 S. Ct. at 2477. A Nevada state prison policy makes
reasonable efforts to respect nonsmokers' requests for nonsmoking cellmates.
Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2482.
185. See Laura Bly, Smoke-Free Travel: It's On the Rise, DALLAS MORNING
NEws, Mar. 19, 1995, at 7G.
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children are in greatest need of protection and the legisla-
tures must be quick to respond to this need.' 8 6
Laws explicitly tailored to protect children in the home
from secondhand smoke are important for several reasons.
For instance, judges are more likely to protect children if
there is explicit statutory authority for doing so. In addition,
such statutes would place parents on notice that smoking
around children is an offense. In the interim, courts should
utilize existing statutes to provide children protection in the
home. This can be accomplished under child abuse and child
neglect laws. Furthermore, courts should continue to con-
sider secondhand smoke exposure as a factor in determining
the "best interests of the child" in custodial proceedings.
Courts should continue to issue orders prohibiting parental
smoking in the presence of children, whether the parents are
married or divorced.
186. A simplified example of a law explicitly tailored to protect children from
smoke exposure is as follows: "It shall be an offense to knowingly and actively
expose a child with an asthmatic condition to tobacco smoke." Such a statute
would make it perfectly clear to judges and the public that this act is prohibited.
Child abuse and neglect statutes are written with very general terms and rea-
sonable minds could differ on the issue of whether they can (or should) be ex-
tended to secondhand smoke exposure. The explicit statute provides more
reliable and uniform protection to children.
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